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Abstract
In the U.S. campaign contributions by companies play a major role in ¯nancing election campaigns.
We analyze contributions by companies before an election and stock market performance after the election
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have a signi¯cant positive impact on a company's stock market performance after an election, with the
second factor being more important. Furthermore, we ¯nd that hypothetical portfolios of the 30 highest
contributors according to (i) would have earned signi¯cant abnormal returns of up to 0.54% per month
(6.6% p.a.) during the ¯rst year after an election. Investing in a portfolio formed according to (ii) would
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11 Introduction
Ever since the ¯rst states were formed business and politics have been closely connected. Rich businessmen
frequently tried to in°uence politics, and politicians knew that they needed to distribute money to be
successful. Entrepreneurs like Demosthenes in Athens and Crassus in Rome became political leaders. Some,
like the Medici in Tuscany, even took over the whole state. Today the connection between business and
politics is sometimes less visible but probably as strong as ever: a successful businessman like Michael
Bloomberg is mayor of New York City, and the richest men in Italy and Thailand, Silvio Berlusconi and
Thaksin Shinawatra respectively, were prime ministers in their countries.
By setting the national agenda, proposing an annual budget, and de¯ning policies on defense, trade,
environment, etc. the President of the U.S. and his administration a®ect business life in many ways. At the
same time campaign contributions by companies and business associations play a major role in ¯nancing
election campaigns (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003)).
Some authors like Baron (1989), Grier and Munger (1991), and Snyder (1990) argue that for companies
such contributions, like other payments, can be seen as investments that have to yield a return. Jayachandran
(2006) and Roberts (1990a) claim that the economic consequences of campaign contributions can be measured
by looking at the stock price development of contributing companies.
Politics and business are undoubtedly intertwined in many ways { with campaign contributions, lobbying,
public funding of projects, public procurement, and many other factors potentially in°uencing each other.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to cover all of these factors. Here we focus on campaign contributions
before an election and the stock market performance of contributing companies after the election. In our ¯rst
research question we analyze the impact of campaign contributions from an individual company perspective.
Speci¯cally, we explore whether total contributions of a company and the distribution of contributions to the
winner and loser of an election had a signi¯cant impact on abnormal returns of its stocks. Both questions
are answered using data from the four presidential elections since 1992.
We ¯nd that (i) the percentage of contributions given to the winner in a presidential election and (ii)
2the log of total contribution (divided by market capitalization) were both signi¯cantly positive related to
a company's stock market performance in the two years after an election. While both e®ects were visible
under Clinton, the amplitude has become much larger under Bush.
As an illustration: a company contributing exclusively to the winner of a presidential election outper-
formed a company which split its contribution equally to both candidates by 5.5 percentage points in the
¯rst year after the election when the CAPM is applied and by 4.0 percentage points using Carhart (1997)'s
4-factor model.
Even more signi¯cantly, when we compare two companies with equal market capitalization but di®erent
total contributions we ¯nd that a company giving four times the average contribution outperformed a
company contributing the average by 12.9 (9.0) percentage points with the CAPM (4-factor model) in
the twelve months after Election Day.
In our second research question we analyze whether an investor could have earned economically and
statistically signi¯cant abnormal returns if he had structured his portfolio according to contribution data.
We ¯nd that hypothetical portfolios of the 30 highest contributors according to (i) the percentage of
contributions given to the winner in a presidential election and (ii) the log of total contribution (divided
by market capitalization) would have yielded signi¯cant abnormal returns. An investor selecting a portfolio
according to (i) would have earned signi¯cant abnormal returns of up to 0.54% per month (6.6% p.a.) on
aggregate when the CAPM is applied during the ¯rst year after an election. Investing in a portfolio formed
according to (ii) would have yielded abnormal returns of up to 1.21% (15.5% p.a.) per month for the same
observation period.
The debate on campaign ¯nancing is often heated and emotional, we therefore want to stress that our
results should in no way be seen as a moral judgement. We cannot distinguish whether stock prices of
¯rms supporting the winner of an election increase because ¯rms contribute to politicians whose intrinsic
views match the ¯rms' interest or whether donations a®ect a president's policies. A government need not
be corrupt for companies supporting it to perform well; e.g. the known Republican attitude towards tort
law, environmental protection, and national defense is quite di®erent from the Democrats' attitude to these
issues and thus the outcome of a presidential election may in°uence many companies' pro¯ts without the
3government explicitly ful¯lling any demands of big contributors. It is more likely that, before the election,
companies make contributions to the candidate they expect to implement policies that favor them.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview over the existing literature, Section 3
provides a description of the data set. The econometric model is presented in Section 4 and the results
follow in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
There are two main strands of literature relevant for our study: studies on political business cycles, mostly
done by economists, and studies on campaign contributions, predominantly conducted by political scientists.
Studies on political business cycles, pioneered by Nordhaus (1975) and Rogo® (1990) usually aim to mea-
sure (i) whether a strong macroeconomic development favors the incumbent, and (ii) whether the election of
a candidate in°uences the stock market. There is broad consensus on the ¯rst question { a healthy economy
undoubtedly increases the chances of re-election for a candidate or party. On the second question data past
1927 shows that the stock market performed better under Democratic presidents, than under Republicans
(e.g. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003)). However, Nofsinger (2007) shows that over a longer horizon (since
1828) there is no statistically signi¯cant di®erence in stock returns between presidencies of the two parties.
Political scientists discuss several di®erent questions: Who gives? Who gets? Do contributions in°uence
decision makers? Are contributions 'good' or 'bad'? On the last question a simple 'bad' (corruption!) comes
too easy. John Samples, Director of the Cato Institute's Center for Representative Government argues that
politicians seldom take their cues from donors, rather they attract money from people who approve of their
policies. Coleman (2003) argues that money is necessary and good to ensure an informative campaign, which
increases voters' knowledge about candidates and their ideas.
Who gives? Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) estimate that 21 million individuals con-
tributed an average of 115 dollar to the elections in 2000, but a signi¯cant share also comes from companies
and special interest groups. Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2008) report that the average ¯rm participat-
ing in the political donation process contributes to 73 candidates for Congress or Senate over any ¯ve-year
4period. They ¯nd that the number of supported candidates has a signi¯cant positive relation with future
excess returns. In addition, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi (2002) and Sabato (1984) report a close
link between corporate campaign contributions and lobbying activities: groups that give large amounts to
political campaigns also emphasize lobbying. Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) claim that
lobbying expenditures are at least ten times as high as corporate campaign contributions, so the contribution
data we use is probably just the 'tip of the iceberg' of corporate money invested to gain access to politicians'
ears. Still it is a good proxy for a company's overall involvement, as contributions and lobbying activities
seem to be highly correlated.
Who gets? On the congressional level the answer is: committee chairs and incumbents (Ansolabehere
and Snyder (1999); Grier and Munger (1991); Romer and Snyder (1994)). At the presidential level, which
is the focus of our study, the answer depends more on the contributor: unions and lawyers give mostly to
the Democrats, companies predominantly to the Republicans (e.g. in our data sample 63% of corporate
contribution went to the Republicans). Looking at totals, Republicans usually receive 15 to 45 percent more
in overall contributions than Democrats.1
Do contributions in°uence decision makers? On this question we found only one study also covering
presidential elections, while all other studies focus on members of Congress. Goldman, Rocholl, and So
(2008b) found that if a company's board members are connected to the winner (loser) of an election they
are more likely to see an increase (decrease) of the government contracts awarded to them. The clear ¯nding
of the studies looking at the Congress is that members of Congress are hardly ever in°uenced in their
voting behavior by contributions (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003)). Other factors, most
prominently the party, play a much more important role than contributions. However, Stratmann (1991,
2002) suggest that contributions by business associations have in°uenced members of Congress.
Talking about corporate campaign contributions Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) say
that corporate and industry political action committees (PACs) may indeed behave as if they expect favors
in return and that they may get a reasonable rate of return. In addition, some authors argue that economic
interest groups usually appear to act as rational investors when making contributions (e.g, Ansolabehere and
1Source: www.opensecrets.org.
5Snyder (2000); Grier and Munger (1991); Kroszner and Stratmann (1998); Snyder (1990, 1992)). Several
studies even interpret contributions as investments (Baron (1989); Denzau and Munger (1986); Grier and
Munger (1991); Snyder (1990)). However, as Jayachandran (2006) notes, previous research's focus on votes
on the °oor of Congress is probably not the best approach, as such votes are highly visible { politicians do
not want to be seen as favoring their donors!
We therefore look at contributions by listed corporations only, as here the impact of policies should be
visible in the stock prices of contributing companies. Schwert (1981) was the ¯rst to recommend the use of
stock prices as a means of quantifying the impact of policy changes. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1988) analyze
how the valuation of securities changes with new legislation. A recent paper linking campaign contributions
and performance of stocks is Jayachandran (2006). She examines stock prices after Senator Je®ords left the
Republican party in May 2001, thereby tipping control of the U.S. Senate to the Democrats. Looking at
soft money contributions in the previous election cycle she ¯nds that for each 250.000 dollar given to the
Republicans a company lost 0.8% of its market capitalization. She concludes that "shifts in political power
have a large e®ect on the market value of ¯rms" (Jayachandran (2006), p. 398).
We take up this point and look at the events in U.S. politics that o®er the clearest and most important
'shifts in political power' { the presidential elections. While Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2008) report
that the switch of congressional control had no signi¯cant in°uence on stock returns of companies classi¯ed
as leaning towards one of the two parties, this question has not been answered for presidential elections.
Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008a) and Knight (2006) ¯nd that listed companies aligned with the Republicans
performed better than Democratic-leaning companies after the presidential election in 2000. We therefore
classify 'government' and 'opposition' as the party holding the presidency and the other party respectively,
i.e. the Democrats under Clinton were the government from 1992-2000 and the Republicans under Bush
were the government 2000-2008.
Like us Alesina and Roubini (1992), Erikson (1989), Fair (1988), and Hibbs (1987) focus on presidential
rather than congressional election outcomes. While these studies look at the economy in general, Herron,
Lavin, Cram, and Silver (1999) move towards the micro level by analyzing 74 di®erent industry sectors.
They ¯nd that 15 of these sectors were seriously a®ected by the outcome to the 1992 presidential election.
6Similarly, Roberts (1990b) ¯nds that the performance of a portfolio of defense companies correlated positively
with the likelihood of Ronald Reagan to become president in 1980. We continue this trend towards the micro
level by looking at individual companies. Speci¯cally we take those 100 companies which contributed most to
campaigns during a given presidential election cycle and analyze how their stocks perform after the election.
3 Data
We look at the four presidential elections from 1992-2004.2 We collect contribution data for the two years
before an election and explore possible e®ects on the stock returns in the two years after the election.3
Therefore we use campaign contribution data from 1990-1992, 1994-1996, 1998-2000, and 2002-2004. Stock
market data are collected for 1992-1994, 1996-1998, 2000-2002 and 2004-2006.4
3.1 Campaign contribution data
Campaign ¯nancing in the U.S. is covered by several laws. The ¯rst relevant piece of legislation was the
Tillman Act of 1907, which banned all corporate contributions to federal political campaigns { at least on
paper. However, the law o®ered many loopholes and was only weakly enforced (Schultz (2000)). It took
more than six decades until a new law { the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 { was enacted
(Alexander (1976); Corrado (2006)). This law allows contributions by individuals, corporations, and non-
pro¯t organizations (most prominently Political Action Committees, PACs), but it sets strict limits to the
maximum amounts donated. An amendment in 1974 created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to
clarify and enforce the law, administer the public funding program, and facilitate disclosure.5
2We have to limit our study to this period, as until 1991 parties did not have to report who gave 'soft money', so it was
literally untraceable (Nelson (2000)). As we need to assign contributions speci¯cally to companies for our analyses elections
before 1991 cannot be covered.
3We chose a two-year time horizon for stock prices, as after the mid-term elections the observation window for the next
contribution period starts and non-overlapping windows are highly desirable for the statistical analyses.
4All data are collected from the day after an election until the day before the next mid-term election.
5Source: FEC, www.fec.gov.
7In 2002 this law was amended again with the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). This act expands
FECA's de¯nition of independent expenditures to include political parties, and it outlaws contributions
known as 'soft money'. Contrary to 'hard money' (contributions that are o±cially registered and ¯led with
the FEC), this 'soft money' comes from donations that avoid federal regulations, e.g. by donating to a party
organization rather than to a particular candidate or campaign (Nelson (2000)). In the 1990ies soft money
grew enormously and by 2002, the last cycle before it was banned, 40% of all contributions were 'soft money'
(Jayachandran (2006)). However, after the ban contributors obviously only switched to 'hard money', as
overall contributions increased by 18.2% in the election cycle 2003-2004 (the ¯rst cycle where soft money was
no longer allowed) compared to the previous election cycle 1999-2000. Hard money contributions jumped
by 97.1% in the same period.6 In addition, new loopholes were easily found and total contributions have
grown from election cycle to election cycle with the election 2008 virtually certain to set a new record.7
Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ueda (2004) explore whether the introduction of BCRA had an e®ect on the
stock prices of companies which gave soft money before the ban, but they ¯nd no signi¯cant impact.
Figure 1 presents the development of total campaign contributions for the presidential elections since
1992. We see that total contributions increased by 18 to 43 percent from one election to the next and
that the Republicans always raised more money than the Democrats. Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and
Snyder (2003) ¯nd that overall contributions as a share of GDP have remained fairly stable since 1912.
Our data con¯rm this for the period 1990-2004, as overall contributions grew by a nominal annual rate
of 5.4%, compared to 5.0% for the U.S. economy. However, corporate contributions grew much faster than
overall contributions: combined donations by the Top-100 listed corporate contributors of each election cycle
increased from 53.5 million dollar in the 1990-1992 election period to more than 128 million dollar in the
years 2002-2004 { an annualized growth of 7.5 percent. The largest corporate contribution per election cycle
in our sample increased even more { from 1.89 million dollar to 6.74 million dollar { an annualized growth
6Source: Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org.
7The most notable 'loopholes' are advocacy groups called 501(c) groups and 527 groups, which may raise unlimited contribu-
tions which they can spend without limitations on issues they consider important (Cusick (2007)). These groups are essentially
the new 'soft money', spending more than 600 million dollar in the 2003-2004 cycle (Source: Center for Responsive Politics).
8of 11.2%. This growth rate even dwarfs the S&P500 increase of 8.8% per year in the same period.8
Insert Figure 1 about here
In the elections we cover, on average 63 percent of corporate contributions were given to the Republicans.
The Democrats rely strongly on other sources for funding, namely unions and lawyers. While labor unions
usually give 85 to 95% of their contributions to the Democrats the donors with the highest total amounts
are lawyers.9 Their strong support for the Democrats stems from worries about tort-law regulations, which
threaten one of lawyers' most important sources of income. A recent federal law { the 'Class Action Fairness
Act 2005' signed by President Bush on February 18th 2005 { con¯rmed lawyers' worries and the hopes of
many companies: with this act class actions are only possible before a federal court, lowering the chances of
success signi¯cantly.
Zaleski (1992) explores which industries give relatively much to political campaigns. His results show
that government purchases from an industry are the main determinant, i.e. companies give much when the
government is an important customer (as e.g. in defense). A second relevant factor is industry concentration,
which should be neither too high (a monopolist does not need much lobbying) nor too low. The latter con¯rms
an earlier ¯nding by Pittman (1988).
The campaign data we use is hard and soft money combined. More speci¯cally it includes PAC, individual
and soft money contributions to federal candidates, party committees and leadership PACs. The data for the
two years preceding each election from 1992 until 2004 were provided by the Center for Responsive Politics.10
For each presidential election we take those 100 companies which made the highest total contribution for
Democrats and Republicans combined. Other studies take each company that contributed, no matter how
much (up to 1,200 companies), rather than focusing on the largest contributors. However, we think this
might distort results, as only really high contributions should have an in°uence. By taking all contributions,
8All growth rates are nominal. Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Thomson Datastream, and Federal Election Com-
mission for GDP, S&P500, and campaign contribution data respectively.
9For the 2004 election they contributed a total of 147 million dollar { 73 percent of this money went to Democrats. Source:
www.opensecrets.org.
10http://www.opensecrets.org.
9some papers assign the same weight to each contribution, no matter whether it was 1,000 or 5 million dollar
(e.g. Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2007)).
3.2 Stock market data
To measure the impact of political events on the value of a company we do not need to develop new measures
or proxies, as the stock price on an e±cient market already is a precise measure for the company value. If
the stock market is at least semi-strong form e±cient it aggregates traders' opinions about the value of a
company and therefore re°ects all publicly available information about a company (see Fama (1970, 1991);
von Hayek (1945)).
Daily stock prices (adjusted for dividends and splits) and market capitalization were collected from
Thomson Datastream for the period November 6th 1992 to November 7th 2006. Time series on the CRSP-
performance-index and on the Fama/French-factors (Fama and French (1993)), including the Carhart (1997)
momentum factor, were provided by Kenneth French.11
4 Research questions and method
4.1 Research question 1: Company perspective { Did the proportion given to
the winner and the total contribution have predictive power?
With the ¯rst research question we take a look at the inhomogeneity in contributions to test for abnormal
returns. To estimate the relationship between company i's campaign contributions during the election
campaign period and its stock price after the election, we lag our contribution-related variables by one
election cycle. E.g., we relate company i's campaign contribution from the day after the election in November
1996 until the day before the election in November 1998 to company i's performance from the day after the
election in November 1998 until the day before the election in November 2000. In the subsequent analyses
we examine companies along two factors:
² the preference for one candidate over the other measured by PERCDIFF and
11http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
10² the logarithm of the total contribution for both candidates divided by the company's market capital-
ization on Election Day, called CTOT.
With PERCDIFF we measure company i's relative preference of one candidate over the other, irrespective
of the total amount contributed. PERCDIFFi;j is the di®erence of the percentage given to the winner
( CGOV
TOTAL) and the percentage given to the losing candidate ( COPP








CGOVi;j and COPPi;j de¯ne company i's contribution to the winning and losing candidate in election j
and TOTALi;j stands for the total contribution given.
While PERCDIFF measures the commitment to one of the two candidates, our second variable CTOT
picks up the overall political involvement of a company. This variable is important to account for companies
like Citigroup and AT&T, which were among the largest contributors in each election, but split their contri-
bution almost equally among the two candidates. Thus their coe±cient for PERCDIFF is close to zero. We
interpret this as a 'hedging-strategy' to ensure that they have access to the government irrespective of the
election outcome. This explanation is supported by Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003), p. 126
who state that "campaign contributions are one way to improve the chances of getting to see the legislator
about matters of concern to the group".
CONTi;j (used in robustness check II) is calculated as the log of the total contribution of a company
divided by its market capitalization on Election Day. We divide by market capitalization because a con-
tribution of $5 million signals very high political involvement when given by a small company with market
capitalization below $1 billion, while it is 'peanuts' for Microsoft with a market capitalization of more than
$300 billion. As campaign contributions of companies are increasing over time, we apply the following







11We divide each contribution by the average contribution in the corresponding election cycle. The same
is done for market capitalization, as this variable also increased several-fold during our sample period.
As we have several observations over time for most companies, we use a panel regression model with
PERCDIFF and CTOT as independent variables. To generate the appropriate data set we ¯rst set up an
OLS-estimation for stock i using (i) the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) developed by Sharpe (1964)
and Lintner (1965), and (ii) Carhart (1997)'s 4-factor model according to equations 3 and 4, respectively.
Fama and French (1993) show that not only the market return, but two more factors (company size (SMB)
and book-to-market ratio (HML)) have explanatory power. Carhart (1997) extended this to a 4-factor model
by adding a momentum factor:
RTRFt = ® + ¯1RMRFt + ¯AR1RTRFt¡1 + ²t; (3)
RTRFt = ® + ¯1RMRFt + ¯2SMBt + ¯3HMLt + ¯4MOMt +
+ ¯AR1RTRFt¡1 + ²t: (4)
RTRFi;t indicates the di®erence between company i's daily log-returns (RTi;t) and the daily risk-free interest
rate (RFt), which is approximated by the monthly T-bill return. RMRFi;t de¯nes the daily excess log-return
of a value-weighted performance index composed of all AMEX, NYSE and NASDAQ stocks (CRSP-Index)
relative to RFt. SMBi;t is the di®erence in return of a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks.
HMLi;t measures the di®erence in returns of a portfolio consisting of stocks with high book-to-market ratios
and a portfolio of stocks with low book-to-market ratios. With MOMi;t we include the momentum anomaly
¯rst reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). MOMi;t measures the di®erence of a portfolio consisting
of past high-return stocks and a portfolio of past low-return stocks.12 Finally, we account for ¯rst-order
12For a detailed description of all factors see Fama and French (1993) and the website of Kenneth French:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html. Note, that all factors include all AMEX, NYSE
12autocorrelation by adding a AR(1)-term as it is often signi¯cant when using daily data (Edmans, Garcia,
and Norli (2007)).
Let ^ ²i;t denote a time series of daily residuals from equation 4 for stock i. We then calculate the 2-year





Tj de¯nes the number of trading days within election cycle j. To look at the development of abnormal
stock returns over time after Election Day we also calculate returns for both the ¯rst six and twelve months
after the election. Therefore, we additionally set Tj to 126 and 252 trading days, respectively. Earlier
studies on this subject often focused on a very short time horizon, i.e. one day to one week. E.g. Goldman,
Rocholl, and So (2008a) ¯nd that companies with boards that are connected to the Republicans signi¯cantly
outperformed the market over the period of one to seven days after Election Day 2000, where Bush was
elected president. While such studies are useful, we chose to look at the longer horizons of 6, 12, and 24
months, as implementing new laws and assigning government contracts takes time. This view is shared by
Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2007) who are in favor of long-term studies and argue that if donating to
winners does represent an investment, positive e®ects should be persistent. Again, we apply the same lag
structure regarding contributions and returns as in all other analyses in this paper.
Finally, we set up the following panel regression:
yi;j = ® + PERCDIFFi;j¡1 +
+ CTOTi;j¡1 + ²i;j: (6)
Note that we do not correct for cross-section ¯xed e®ects, since this would eliminate the very idiosyncratic
growth rates of individual stocks we want to measure. We do not correct for period ¯xed e®ects either, as they




To test the reliability of our model, we run two robustness checks each for the CAPM and the 4-factor
model with variations of our dependent and independent variables. First, to account for unsystematic risk
we calculate normalized returns (NRTi;j) as dependent variable by dividing the 6-month, 1-year, and 2-year





To arrive at ^ ¾i;j we multiply the average daily standard deviation of stock i's residuals with the square
root of the number of trading days of interest Tj (126, 252, and approximately 500 respectively) in cycle j.
In the second robustness check we examine the reliability of the independent variable CTOT by regressing
against the unbenchmarked total contribution log(CONT).
4.2 Research question 2: Investor perspective { Could abnormal returns be
generated by picking stocks according to contribution data?
While in research question 1 we focused on the company perspective, in research question 2 we explore
whether an investor could have earned abnormal return by selecting portfolios according to the two variables
CTOT and PERCDIFF.
The empirical literature o®ers numerous examples where statistically signi¯cant abnormal returns are
reported to justify an 'anomaly', but once transaction costs are taken into account the signi¯cance often
disappears.13 If an investor wanted to trade based on our results only two transactions were necessary every
two years for stock i { thus transaction costs play only a marginal role.
13Some examples where e®ects are reported include Ariel (1990); Kim and Park (1994); Kohli and Kohers (1992); Lakonishok
and Smidt (1988). Malkiel (2003) and Marquering, Nisser, and Valla (2006) claim that after transaction costs almost all of
these 'anomalies' fail to deliver positive abnormal returns.
14In the literature there is still a debate about measuring abnormal returns. Barber and Lyon (1997) argue
that calculating buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of event ¯rms is the right approach, as it precisely
measures investor experience. In two seminal papers Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Sta®ord (2000) provide
arguments and evidence against the BHAR methodology as it completely ignores the cross correlation of event
¯rms abnormal returns during the observation period { resulting in overstated test statistics. Instead, they
advocate a monthly calendar-time portfolio approach for measuring long-term abnormal returns. Therefore,
a portfolio has to be formed each period including all companies that have participated in the event. With
this approach, the cross correlation among the event ¯rms is automatically accounted for in the portfolio
variance of each month. When calculating portfolios this way one has to decide whether to include the ¯rms
equally- or value-weighted. Fama (1998) reports that long-term post-event returns shrink a lot when the
stocks are value-weighted rather than equal-weighted. Another aspect for value-weighting the portfolios is
that it may account for the wealth e®ects of individual investors more accurately (see Fama (1998)). We
consciously chose the most rigorous and demanding methodology { the calendar-time portfolio approach
with value-weights among the stocks, so any results we ¯nd are highly reliable.
We form six value-weighted portfolios according to our two measures PERCDIFF and CTOT for each
election cycle:14
² PERCDIFF30: Top 30 ranked stocks according to the variable PERCDIFF.
² PERCDIFF31 70: stocks ranked from 31 to 70 according to PERCDIFF.
² PERCDIFF71 100: stocks ranked from 71 to 100 according to PERCDIFF.
² With the portfolios CTOT30, CTOT31 70, CTOT71 100, the same is done for the variable CTOT.
Our last portfolio is composed of the Top-100 contributors of each election cycle (PF Top100) to see
whether all companies under investigation can earn abnormal returns as a group. If they are an unbiased
14The same lag structure regarding contributions and returns is used as in the previous calculations. Note that a stock may
be included in up to two of the six portfolios for a given election. E.g. a company making a high total contribution and
giving most to the Democrats before a Clinton victory could be included in the CTOT30 and PERCDIFF30 portfolios for that
election.
15sample of the market, they should yield no abnormal returns.
For research question 2 we again use the CAPM and the 4-factor model for performance measurement:
RTRF
PF
j;t = ® + ¯1RMRFj;t + ²j;t; (8)
RTRF
PF
j;t = ® + ¯1RMRFj;t + ¯2SMBj;t + ¯3HMLj;t + ¯4MOMj;t + ²j;t: (9)
Due to the midterm elections, we only measure the return up to two years following Election Day.
Therefore, we cannot run a simple OLS-regression, as our time series is not continuous. Instead, we apply
a panel regression for each portfolio with the four elections as cross-sections (j) and with 24 observations
(months) over time (t). We correct with the 'White period' coe±cient covariance method to account for
arbitrary serial correlation and time-varying variances in the residuals.
5 Results
5.1 Main result 1: The proportion given to the winner and the total contribu-
tion had predictive power
In Section 4.1 we hypothesize that the two independent variables measuring (i) the commitment of a company
to a candidate (PERCDIFF) and (ii) the log of the total contribution relative to company size (CTOT) should
have a signi¯cant positive in°uence on its stock market performance.
As can be seen in Table 1, PERCDIFF is positive for all observation periods for the aggregate data
set. With the CAPM it is signi¯cant for the 6- and 12-month horizon, while with the 4-factor model it is
signi¯cant on the 24-month horizon. As an illustration: A company which contributed only to the winning
candidate on average outperformed a company which contributed equally to both candidates by 5.5 (4.0)
percentage points in the ¯rst year after an election using the CAPM (4-factor model).
Insert Table 1 about here
Looking at the Clinton and Bush presidencies separately we ¯nd highly signi¯cant coe±cients for Bush
with the CAPM on all horizons, and otherwise positive but insigni¯cant coe±cients. Under Clinton a
16company contributing only to him outperformed a company which split its contribution equally to both
candidates by 6.8 (8.2) percentage points in the ¯rst year after an election with the CAPM (4-factor model).
Under Bush the di®erence even reaches 12.3 (4.4) percentage points in the twelve months after an election.
For CTOT we ¯nd even clearer results with highly signi¯cant positive coe±cients in the aggregate data
for all observation periods. To illustrate our results we compare two hypothetical companies with average
market capitalization but with di®erent total contributions. Whereas company A gives four times the average
contribution, company B only spends the average contribution of the Top-100 listed corporate contributors.15
Company A would have outperformed company B by on average 12.9 (9.0) percentage points in the ¯rst
year after the election when the CAPM (4-factor model) is applied. The results for Clinton and Bush are
quite consistent with positive signi¯cant coe±cients on all observations with 10 of the 12 coe±cients being
signi¯cant on the 1%- or 5%-level. Especially the results for Bush are economically highly signi¯cant, as
company A outperforms company B by 17.1 (11.4) percentage points in the ¯rst twelve months following
Election Day when the CAPM (4-factor model) is used. Looking at the two-year horizon the di®erence in
returns even reaches 30.3 (23.4) percentage points.16
We conclude that CTOT was the more decisive factor to generate abnormal returns from 1992-2006.
Furthermore, as can be seen from PERCDIFF, companies which strongly supported the winner of the election
outperformed companies supporting the losing candidate. Both factors were economically and statistically
more signi¯cant during the Bush presidency.
5.1.1 Robustness Checks
As can be seen from Tables A1 (CAPM) and A2 (4-factor model) in the Appendix, our results are robust
to changes in the dependent as well as the independent variables. In our ¯rst robustness check we replace
abnormal returns by the normalized returns (NRTi;j) as shown in equation 7. The signi¯cant results we ¯nd
are very similar to what we found in our original analysis for the aggregate data set and for both the Clinton
15E.g. in the election 2004 the average of the Top-100 corporate contributors was 1.28 million dollar, up from 535,000 in
1992.
16We also ran an OLS-regression for each election cycle separately and found similar results.
17and Bush subsamples.
Insert Table A2 about here
In the second robustness check we change the independent variable CTOT with all other things un-
changed. Speci¯cally, log(CONT) is not transformed, i.e. this number is not benchmarked on the respective
average per election cycle. On aggregate and in both subsamples our main results hold in all respects and {
as in robustness check I { some results even improve.
5.2 Main result 2: Picking stocks according to contribution data generated
abnormal returns for investors
As outlined in Section 4.2 we now focus on the investor perspective and examine the performance of portfolios
formed according to contribution data.
5.2.1 Performance of a portfolio of all 100 companies
Before we look at sub-portfolios we examine our whole data sample and calculate whether the return of the
largest 100 contributors as a group di®ered from the market return. In Table 2 we apply the CAPM and
the 4-factor-model of equations 8 and 9 to examine whether the monthly abnormal returns (alphas) deviate
signi¯cantly from zero.
Insert Table 2 about here
Applying the CAPM (column 1) we ¯nd no signi¯cant results for the aggregate sample. The same holds
true when we look at the Clinton and Bush presidencies separately (columns 3 and 5 respectively). Thus,
the return of the 100 largest contributors as a group was not di®erent from the market return.
When we apply the 4-factor-model we also ¯nd no signi¯cant results (columns 2, 4, and 6). The additional
coe±cients for SMB and HML indicate that our sample includes mainly large cap stocks with high book-to-
market ratios. This con¯rms the observation of Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2008), that mostly large
companies contribute to political campaigns.
18We thus conclude that the returns of major contributors as a group were not distinguishable from the
market { no matter whether we use the CAPM or whether size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum are
accounted for with the 4-factor model.
5.2.2 Performance of sub-portfolios
In what we consider one of the key analyses of the paper we measure the performance of portfolios selected
according to the two variables PERCDIFF and CTOT formed in Section 4.2. Figure 2 illustrates the results.
In the top panels we sort our companies according to the variable PERCDIFF in each election cycle and
calculate a value-weighted portfolio of the corresponding Top 30 stocks (solid line; PERCDIFF30; the 30
clearest supporters of a candidate) and a value-weighted portfolio of the corresponding stocks with ranks
71 to 100 (dotted line; PERCDIFF71 100; the 30 companies leaning most towards his opponent). The
¯gures present the cumulative abnormal returns of these portfolios compared to the CRSP-Index. In the
bottom panels we sort according to the variable CTOT in each election cycle. Again, the ¯gures present the
cumulative abnormal returns compared to the CRSP-Index of the CTOT30- and CTOT71 100-portfolios.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The two left panels, presenting the results for Clinton, look fairly similar. In both ¯gures the PERCDIFF30-
and CTOT30-portfolios accumulate positive abnormal returns, while the PERCDIFF71 100- and CTOT71 100-
portfolios accumulate negative abnormal returns in the 20 months after the election, for a net di®erence of
up to 20 percentage points. Therefore, large contributors, especially the strongest supporters of Clinton,
performed very well after his election victories.
The results for Bush are presented in the right panels. We immediately see, that the return di®erences
between the portfolios are larger than they were for Clinton. Comparing the two panels we ¯nd that the
development is quite similar in the ¯rst year after the election, where the highest contributors according to
both measures outperform the lowest contributors by up to 25 percent. In the second year the two ¯gures
di®er somewhat: while the di®erence between the PERCDIFF30- and PERCDIFF71 100-portfolios remains
quite stable at roughly 20 to 25 percentage points, the di®erence between the CTOT30- and CTOT71 100-
portfolios grows over the whole observation period to more than 45 percentage points. This corroborates
19the comparatively higher predictive power of CTOT during the Bush years that was already evident in the
panel regressions reported above.
Turning from the graphical to the econometric analysis, Table 3 presents results for the ¯rst 24 (top three
panels), 12 (panels 4 to 6) and 6 (last three panels) months after each election. The ¯rst two columns show
the alphas of the PERCDIFF30 and PERCDIFF71 100-portfolios, i.e. the companies with the highest 30
values for PERCDIFF and with the lowest 30 values, respectively.17 The ¯rst line of each panel shows the
monthly CAPM-alpha, the second line the respective p-value, the third line the monthly alpha according to
the 4-factor model, and the fourth line the respective p-value. The right two columns present the same data
for portfolios formed according to CTOT.
Insert Table 3 about here
Looking ¯rst at the CAPM-alphas, which can be considered the more relevant for investors, we see that
in the ¯rst column of Table 3 all nine monthly CAPM-alphas of the PERCDIFF30 portfolios are positive
(¯ve of them signi¯cant) with values up to 0.76% per month. This means that abnormal returns of up to
9.4% p.a. could have been earned when investing in the 30 companies with the highest share of contributions
to the winning candidate. Also in line with our prediction, eight out of the nine PERCDIFF71 100 portfolios
show negative CAPM-alphas between {0.58% and {0.15% per month. Three are signi¯cant on the 1-percent
level, stressing the economic and statistical relevance of the results.
When we turn to the alphas of the PERCDIFF-portfolios according to the 4-factor model most signi¯-
cances disappear, as this model already accounts for size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum.
In the right two columns the results of CTOT, which delivered much more signi¯cant results on our ¯rst
research question, are reported. We ¯nd very consistent and strong results for the CAPM: all CTOT30-
alphas for the aggregate and the separated data samples are positive and signi¯cant on the 1-percent level
with alphas between 0.26% and 1.46% per month. This translates into abnormal returns of up to 19.0% per
year. Also in line with our predictions the alphas of all CTOT71 100-portfolios are negative with ¯ve of the
nine values being signi¯cant on the 1%- and 5%-level.
17We do not show the PERCDIFF31 70- and CTOT31 70-portfolios in this table, as they are of minor interest and are hardly
ever signi¯cant, which is in line with our expectations.
20The results are somewhat weaker when the 4-factor model is applied. We still ¯nd seven of nine alphas
of the CTOT30-portfolios to be positive, ¯ve of them signi¯cant, most of them on the 1%-level. However,
here we also have one signi¯cant negative alpha for the 12-month horizon under Clinton.
Taking a look at both presidencies separately we ¯nd that under Clinton six out of twelve and under Bush
eight out of twelve CTOT30- and CTOT71 100-portfolios are signi¯cant on the 1%-level with the predicted
sign (CAPM and 4-factor model alphas).
We conclude that forming portfolios according to PERCDIFF and especially according to CTOT allowed
investors to earn signi¯cant abnormal returns, while those who invested into a portfolio of the companies
with the lowest values of PERCDIFF and CTOT su®ered negative abnormal returns.
6 Conclusion
By setting the national agenda, proposing an annual budget, and de¯ning policies on defense, trade, en-
vironment, etc. the president and his secretaries a®ect business life in many ways. Our results show that
companies which had supported the elected president in his election campaign or had high total contributions
were able to generate signi¯cant abnormal returns.
Speci¯cally we ¯nd that both (i) the percentage of contributions given to the winner in a presidential
election and (ii) the log of the total contribution (divided by market capitalization) signi¯cantly increased a
company's abnormal stock market return in the two years after an election in the period 1992-2006. Among
the two factors the second turned out to have a larger impact.
A company contributing only to the winner would have outperformed a company splitting its contribution
equally to both candidates by 5.5 percentage points in the ¯rst year after the election when the CAPM is
applied and by 4.0 percentage points using Carhart (1997)'s 4-factor model. On the other hand, when we
compare two companies with equal market capitalization but di®erent total contributions we ¯nd the larger
total contributor (giving four times the average) to outperform the smaller total contributor (giving the
average) by 12.9 (9.0) percentage points when using the CAPM (4-factor model) in the twelve months after
Election Day. Both variables had a stronger e®ect under Bush.
In our last analysis we formed hypothetical portfolios of the 30 highest contributors according to (i)
21the percentage of contributions given to the winner in a presidential election and (ii) the log of the total
contribution (divided by market capitalization). An investor selecting a portfolio according to (i) would have
earned signi¯cant abnormal returns of up to 0.54% per month (6.6% p.a.) when the CAPM is applied during
the ¯rst year after an election. Investing in a portfolio formed according to (ii) would have yielded abnormal
returns of up to 1.21% per month (15.5% p.a.) for the same observation period.
Campaign contributions thus proved to be a good predictor variable for abnormal stock returns after an
election. We consider this even more remarkable, as we covered two very di®erent presidencies with strongly
di®ering developments on the stock markets, e.g. the forming and bursting of the tech-bubble, and with
unexpected exogenous shocks like 9/11 and the war on terror. Still, there are several other relevant variables
that may play a role in the mutually in°uencing network of politics and business, e.g. lobbying activities and
personal closeness between high government representatives and business leaders. As lobbying and campaign
contributions are highly correlated, we expect similar results, but we leave this to future research. We are
not aware of a comprehensive data base on personal closeness and refrained from presenting only anecdotic
evidence.
To conclude, we want to stress that our results do not necessarily mean that politicians deliver policies that
companies 'bought' with their contributions. Rather, the general policies implemented by an administration
may suit a ¯rm { e.g. President Bush's decisions to stay out of the Kyoto-protocol, allow drilling in Alaska
natural reservoirs, and his decision to go to war in Iraq have all helped oil companies. However, they were
not necessarily designed to help them, but rather re°ected Bush's convictions and attitude.
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Figure 1: Development of total campaign contributions for the two years before a presidential election in the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns of equally weighted portfolios composed of 30 stocks each compared to
the CRSP-performance index. Top panels: Portfolio formation according to PERCDIFF with PERCDIFF30
(PERCDIFF71 100) containing the stocks ranked from 1 to 30 (71 to 100) in an election cycle. Bottom panels:
Portfolio formation according to CTOT. The left panels show the development of cumulative abnormal
returns over time during the Clinton presidency, while the right panels present the same data for the Bush
presidency.
31Observation period: 24 months from Election Day - Aggregate data



















































Observation period: 12 months from Election Day - Aggregate data



















































Observation period: 6 months from Election Day - Aggregate data



















































*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signi¯cance levels.
Table 3: Monthly abnormal returns (alphas, in %) of value-weighted portfolios formed according to
PERCDIFF (left two columns) and CTOT (right two columns). p-values for a double-sided test are given
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In the U.S. campaign contributions by companies play a major role in financing 
election campaigns. We analyze contributions by companies before an election and 
stock market performance after the election for the presidential elections from 1992 
until 2004. We find that (i) the percentage of contributions given to the winner in a 
presidential election and (ii) the total contribution (divided by market capitalization) 
have a significant positive impact on a company's stock market performance after an 
election, with the second factor being more important. Furthermore, we find that 
hypothetical portfolios of the 30 highest contributors according to (i) would have 
earned significant abnormal returns of up to 0.54% per month (6.6% p.a.) during the 
first year after an election. Investing in a portfolio formed according to (ii) would have 
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